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INTRODUCTION 
What if, in the popular board game Monopoly, “Get Out of Jail 
Free” cards could only be drawn by a predetermined segment of 
players?1 Further, what if the opportunity to draw the liberating 
vouchers was based on an arbitrary distinction2 that had no bearing 
on past or future performance? In all likelihood, players who could 
draw “Get Out of Jail Free” cards would engage in riskier and 
potentially more rewarding behavior than their opportunity-less 
counterparts because they might be able to “avoid jail” even after an 
unfortunate roll of the dice. Eventually, inducing opportunity-less 
gamers to play at all might prove problematic. 
If corporate management can be considered the game—and 
directors and officers the players—then the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit in F.D.I.C. ex rel. Cooperative Bank v. Rippy3 recently 
interpreted North Carolina law to dictate that only directors have the 
chance to draw the little orange cards. In Rippy, the court held that 
while bank directors were not liable for ordinary negligence, sufficient 
evidence was presented to rebut the presumption that bank officers 
had acted on an informed basis.4 The Rippy court interpreted the 
exculpatory provision as allowing exculpation for directors5—but not 
 
 *  © 2016 Jordan C. Hilton. 
 1.  The Parker Brothers game allows players to buy, rent, and sell properties in an 
effort to bankrupt other players and become the wealthiest player. Parker Bros., 
Monopoly Parker Brothers Real Estate Trading Game, HASBRO.COM (2016), http://
www.hasbro.com/common/instruct/monins.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2KV-XZKX]. “Get Out 
of Jail Free” cards allow players who would otherwise be forced to miss a turn waiting in 
“jail” to circumvent that obstacle and continue playing without interruption. Id. In a game 
predicated on generating money by “passing go” each turn, “Get Out of Jail Free” cards 
provide a significant advantage. See id. 
 2.  For example, if there were a rule that permitted only players with last names 
beginning with letters A–H to be eligible for the bonus cards. 
 3.  799 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 4.  Id. at 313. 
 5.  The Rippy court found that exculpation was not available to directors in cases of 
gross negligence. Id. This Recent Development concerns only breaches of care pursuant to 
ordinary negligence. See infra note 85. 
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officers.6 Central to the Rippy court’s finding of no liability for 
directors was their analysis of an exculpatory provision contained in 
the bank’s bylaws and permitted by the North Carolina Business 
Corporations Act (“NCBCA”).7 Although the bank’s directors and 
officers engaged in the same negligent behavior, only the officers 
were exposed to liability.8 
This Recent Development argues that the NCBCA9 should be 
amended to allow permissive officer exculpation in corporate 
charters. Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the Rippy 
facts and holding, and explains the genesis and evolution of 
exculpatory clauses. Part II argues that (1) North Carolina’s 
management-insulating provisions leave a problematic “gap” in 
liability coverage for officers, (2) the marginal deterrent effect against 
officer misbehavior via liability pursuant to non-exculpation is likely 
outweighed by the costs of enforcing a non-officer exculpating 
scheme, and (3) the current lack of officer exculpation allows for 
inequitable and confusing outcomes as between directors and officers. 
Part III addresses counterarguments, and Part IV concludes by 
recommending that the NCBCA be revised to allow for officer 
exculpation. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Facts and Procedural Posture of Rippy 
Cooperative Bank (“Cooperative”) opened in 1898 and focused 
its operations on single-family housing loans for nearly a century.10 
Determined to increase bank assets, Cooperative’s Board of 
Directors shifted its focus to commercial real estate loans in 2002.11 
Because the FDIC12 backed Cooperative, the FDIC performed 
annual reviews13 of Cooperative’s underwriting and loaning 
 
 6.  Rippy, 799 F.3d at 313. 
 7.  Id. at 312; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §	55-2-02 (2015). 
 8.  §	55-2-02. 
 9.  N.C. GEN. STAT. §	55-2-02 outlines permissive exculpation for directors in 
corporate charters and is a sensible place to position the proposed amendment. See infra 
notes 29–35 and accompanying text. 
 10.  Rippy, 799 F.3d at 313. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) encourages borrowing 
and loaning activity because “insured deposits are backed by the full faith and credit of the 
United States Government.” 12 U.S.C. §	1828(a)(1)(B) (2014). 
 13.  The FDIC performed reviews in conjunction with the North Carolina 
Commission of Banks (“NCCB”). Rippy, 799 F.3d at 307. 
94 N.C.  L. REV. 2155 (2016) 
2016] CORPORATE OFFICER EXCULPATION 2157 
practices.14 While these initial reports15 were relatively favorable, each 
report recommended changes and all of the feedback got 
progressively worse.16 The final report,17 condemning both 
Cooperative’s cursory approval of nine large loans to land developers 
and their rampant use of equity-less “lot loans,”18 gave Cooperative 
the worst possible score in all but one category.19 
Cooperative did not address the issues highlighted in the 
reports.20 During the Great Recession in 2009, Cooperative closed21 
and named the FDIC as receiver.22 The FDIC subsequently sued 
 
 14.  Id. at 308. 
 15.  “Cooperative was scored in each of the following categories: Capital, Asset 
Quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to Market Risk. The 
examination categories collectively are commonly referred to by the acronym CAMELS, 
and are scored on scale [sic] from 1–5, with ‘1’ being the best and ‘5’ being the worst.” Id. 
at 307–08. 
 16.  Five reports are relevant. First, a 2006 FDIC report gave Cooperative a “2” rating 
in each of the CAMELS categories and recommended that Cooperative address issues in 
credit administration, underwriting, audit practices, risk management, and liquidity. Id. at 
308. A 2007 NCCB investigation yielded a substantially similar report. Id. Third, an 
external review by Credit Risk Management (CRM), in addition to finding that 
Cooperative had been slow to address its previously identified issues, suggested that 
Cooperative review its credit files on a more regular basis. Id. In 2008, CRM issued a 
fourth report, again criticizing loan documentation and monitoring, and for the first time, 
assessing failing grades to certain loans. Id. Finally, the FDIC and NCCB issued a joint 
report in November 2008, giving the lowest possible rating to Cooperative in all but one of 
the CAMELS categories. Id. 
 17.  Id. (FDIC and NCCB Joint Report). 
 18.  A “[m]anufactured home lot loan means a loan for the purchase or refinancing of 
a portion of land acceptable to the Secretary as a manufactured home lot.” 24 C.F.R. 
§	201.2 (2015). Cooperative encouraged customers to utilize lot loans by presenting 
investment seminars. After attending the investment seminar, optimistic customers 
became certain that he or she could buy a building lot without putting up any money for 
two years. The idea was to “flip” the lot to someone else as property values continued to 
climb. Floyd Norris, Failed Bank’s Broken Vows Mean Little, N.Y. TIMES Sep. 19, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/19/business/in-ruling-that-favors-failed-bank-promises-
meant-little.html [https://perma.cc/587U-5H92]. 
 19.  Rippy, 799 F.3d at 307–08 (stating that Cooperative scored “fives” in the Capital, 
Asset Quality, Management, Earnings, and Liquidity categories, and a “four” in the 
Sensitivity to Market Risk category). 
 20.  Id. at 313. The FDIC’s expert witness stated that both directors and officers 
“approved loans over the telephone, without first examining the relevant documents.” Id. 
 21.  According to a review conducted by the FDIC Office of Inspector General, the 
FDIC suffered losses of over $200 million due to Cooperative’s failure. Id. at 309. 
 22.  The FDIC is statutorily authorized to function in two separate and distinct 
capacities. “[T]he [FDIC, as a corporation] shall insure the deposits of all insured banks,” 
12 U.S.C. §	1821(a)(1) (2012), and the FDIC shall “as receiver of a closed national 
bank	.	.	.	have the right to appoint an agent or agents to assist it in its duties as such 
receiver.” §	1822(a). See Rippy, 799 F.3d at 307 n.1 (describing FDIC’s receiver capacity). 
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Cooperative’s directors23 and officers24 for negligence, gross 
negligence, and breach of fiduciary duties.25 When the district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants,26 the FDIC 
appealed to the Fourth Circuit.27 
B. Holdings 
The Rippy court28 held that, while North Carolina law 
contemplates suits against bank directors and officers sounding in 
ordinary negligence,29 Cooperative’s directors were shielded from 
liability by an exculpatory provision contained in Cooperative’s 
articles of incorporation.30 Conversely, the Rippy court observed 
simply that “[Cooperative]’s exculpatory provision does not cover 
[Cooperative’s] officers.”31 Because the officers were shielded from 
liability by the business judgment rule32 but not by the articles of 
 
 23.  The nine director-defendants were: Willetts (chief executive officer), Burton 
(director), King (director), Wright (director), Rippy (director), Fensel (director), Bridger 
(director), Hundley (director), and Burrell (director). See Complaint at 2–3, FDIC v. 
Willetts, 48 F. Supp. 3d 844 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (7:11-cv-00165-BO); Lance Duroni, FDIC 
Loses $40M Suit Against NC Community Bank Execs, LAW360 (Sept. 12, 2014, 7:48 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/576912/fdic-loses-40m-suit-against-nc-community-bank-execs 
[https://perma.cc/QC6S-D9DE]. 
 24.  The officers were: Executive Vice-President of Mortgage Lending Bridger and 
Chief Operating Officer Burrell, who both attended almost all board meetings. Complaint, 
supra note 23, at 3. 
 25.  Rippy, 799 F.3d at 308. 
 26.  “The Court finds that defendants are entitled to the business judgment rule’s 
protection as a matter of law and indisputable fact. Therefore the Court enters judgment 
against plaintiff’s claims for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.” FDIC v. Willetts, 48 
F. Supp. 3d 844, 851 (E.D.N.C. 2014) aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part sub nom. 
Rippy, 799 F.3d at 301. 
 27.  Rippy, 799 F.3d at 309–10. 
 28.  Throughout this Recent Development, “Rippy court” refers to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and “Willetts court” refers to the Eastern District 
of North Carolina. 
 29.  Rippy, 799 F.3d at 311. 
 30.  “The exculpatory clause protects directors from monetary liability unless the 
directors ‘knew or believed [that their acts or omissions] were clearly in conflict’ with 
[Cooperative]’s best interests.” Id. at 312–13 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. §	55-2-02(b)(3) 
(2012)). 
 31.  Rippy, 799 F.3d at 313. 
 32.  The business judgment rule is a common law presumption that “in making a 
business decision the directors	.	.	.	acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also Constance Frisby Fain, Corporate Director 
and Officer Liability, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 417, 439 (1996) (examining the 
business judgment rule’s development in conjunction with the duty of care concept); 
Stephen P. Lamb & Joseph Christensen, Duty Follows Function: Two Approaches to 
Curing the Mismatch Between the Fiduciary Duties and Potential Personal Liability of 
Corporate Officers, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 45, 51 (2012) (“The 
94 N.C.  L. REV. 2155 (2016) 
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incorporation, the Rippy court found that the FDIC had presented 
adequate evidence to rebut the initial presumption that the officer-
defendants acted on an informed basis.33 The officers, the Rippy court 
held, could be personally liable for simple negligence.34 
Cooperative’s exculpatory provision did not cover officers 
because it could not cover officers under current North Carolina 
law.35 While the nine defendants were accused of essentially the same 
acts and omissions,36 the statutory limitations on permissive 
exculpation in the NCBCA precluded Cooperative’s officers from 
receiving the same level of protection as their director colleagues.37 
Hence, Rippy effectively highlights the “gap” in liability coverage 
between directors and officers that can arise in duty of care cases. To 
better understand why the liability gap should be closed, some 
background information regarding the origins of director exculpation 
is required. 
C. Exculpation as a Response to Van Gorkom 
The lack of officer exculpation in North Carolina38 is best 
explained as an accident of history and should be conceptualized as a 
product of Smith v. Van Gorkom.39 In Van Gorkom, the chairman of 
the board and CEO Van Gorkom was faced with a decision to sell the 
company.40 After cursory negotiations with a single bidder, Van 
 
business judgment rule sets the fundamental parameters within which control can be 
exercised. It forms a sort of compact between the stockholders and the management to 
whom they are entrusting their capital. The compact is that management will be permitted 
to use the stockholders’ capital to operate the corporation in their best judgment without 
second-guessing by the stockholders (using the courts as the vehicle for such second-
guessing) so long as management does so in pursuit of the corporation’s best interests. In 
other words, the stockholder gives up his wealth to the corporation and irrevocably 
confers discretion on management to employ that wealth profitably.”) (internal citations 
omitted); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks III, Corporate Officers and the 
Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson, 60 BUS. LAW. 865, 870 (2005) 
(arguing that the business judgment rule should be applied to corporate officers). 
 33.  Rippy, 799 F.3d at 313. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  N.C. GEN. STAT. §	55-2-02(b)(3) (2015) (allowing for permissive exculpation of 
directors but not officers). 
 36.  Rippy, 799 F.3d at 314. Of the nine negligently approved commercial real estate 
(CRE) loans, officers and directors approved eight of them together. Complaint, supra 
note 23, at 14. 
 37.  See infra Section II.A. 
 38.  The North Carolina statute is the Model Business Corporations Act provision 
that follows the Delaware pattern. 
 39.  488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), overruled by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 
2009). 
 40.  Id. at 865. 
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Gorkom presented the board with a proposed merger at $55 per 
share.41 Following a two-hour oral presentation, the board decided to 
sell the company.42 The Delaware Supreme Court ultimately held that 
by failing to adequately deliberate about the proposed merger, the 
directors breached their duty of care.43 
In response to this holding and in an attempt to protect directors, 
the Delaware legislature adopted Rule 102(b)(7),44 which allows for 
director (but not officer)45 exculpation if a court finds that the 
director-defendant did not breach the duty of loyalty. Commentators 
have suggested that 102(b)(7) effectively overruled the effect of Van 
Gorkom,46 but such assertions give short shrift to the potential47 
liability of officers in some duty of care cases.48 While Van Gorkom 
exposed both officers and directors, 102(b)(7) and its progeny, for 
reasons discussed below,49 only protects directors. If Van Gorkom, by 
analogy, entirely removed “Get Out of Jail Free Cards” from the 
corporate governance game, then Rule 102(b)(7) reintroduced cards 
that only directors could use. Hence, assertions that director-
exculpating provisions wholly erase the effect of Van Gorkom are 
premature because officers are still partially exposed.50 
D. The Lack of Officer Exculpation: An Accident of History? 
There are at least two reasons why Rule 102(b)(7), and parallel 
state laws (including North Carolina’s) that have followed the rule51 
exclude officers from permissive exculpation: (1) the decision of the 
 
 41.  Id. at 866–68. 
 42.  Id. at 868–69. 
 43.  Id. at 874. 
 44.  For the purposes of this Recent Development, Rule 102(b)(7) claims are used to 
generally describe claims based on director exculpation. 
 45.  “The view was that [102(b)(7)] did not	.	.	.	extend exculpation to officers, except 
insofar as an officer was ‘exercis[ing] the authority of a director.’ Moreover, the Delaware 
Supreme Court all but foreclosed that argument when it noted in Gantler that ‘[a]lthough 
legislatively possible, there currently is no statutory provision authorizing comparable 
exculpation of corporate officers.’	” Lamb & Christensen, supra note 32, at 58. 
 46.  See, e.g., id. at 56–57. 
 47.  While “[t]he exclusion of officers from exculpation has so far been a sleeping 
dog,	.	.	.	if and when it wakes,	.	.	.	it w[ill] be destructive to the rational incentive structures 
reclaimed and rebuilt after Van Gorkom.” Id. at 47. 
 48.  See, e.g., FDIC v. Loudermilk, 984 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1361–62 (N.D. Ga. 2013) 
(holding officers liable for breaching their duty of care by failing to maintain appropriate 
ratios of speculative and low-risk loans). 
 49.  See infra Section I.D. 
 50.  As one commentator has noted, “the chilly winds of Smith v. Van Gorkom still 
blow through the boardroom.” Paul Graf, A Realistic Approach to Officer Liability, 66 
BUS. LAW. 315, 336 (2011). 
 51.  See supra note 38. 
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Van Gorkom court to limit its holding to director liability and (2) 
Delaware’s (pre-2004) pro-officer jurisprudence of personal 
jurisdiction.52 
Because Van Gorkom imposed liability on directors, it was 
directors—particularly outside directors53—who sought relief.54 
Because most corporate officers at the time were simultaneously 
serving as directors, “there seemed to be little need for extending 
protection to officers qua officers.”55 While the director/officer 
distinction may not have been crucial in the Van Gorkom analysis, 
Rippy56 and other decisions57 leave little doubt about contemporary 
courts’ willingness to distinguish between officers and directors in 
duty of care cases. 
A second reason for officer exclusion in Delaware’s (and North 
Carolina’s) exculpatory statute can be explained by examining the law 
of personal jurisdiction. Delaware passed a sequestration statute that 
allowed plaintiffs to sequester stock that directors owned in the 
subject corporation if directors did not appear in litigation 
proceedings.58 Directors challenged this statute in Shaffer v. Heitner, 
where the Court struck it down as violative of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.59 To rectify the defects in their 
sequestration statute, the Delaware legislature passed Section 3114, 
which provided that persons who accept service as a director are 
deemed to have consented to Delaware jurisdiction.60 However, 
“[a]bsent traditional bases of personal jurisdiction,	.	.	.	Delaware 
courts [still] could not hale officers of Delaware corporations into 
their courts under Section 3114—officers would be able to cite Shaffer 
as precluding the exercise of such jurisdiction.”61 In 2004, an 
 
 52.  Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); see text accompanying infra notes 58–67. 
 53.  An outside director is “[a]ny member of a company’s board of directors who is 
not an employee or stakeholder in the company.” Outside Director Definition, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/outsidedirector.asp#ixzz3r90YJ1DO 
[https://perma.cc/VGF4-GWBK]. 
 54.  Dennis R. Honabach, Smith v. Van Gorkom: Managerial Liability and 
Exculpatory Clauses—A Proposal to Fill the Gap of the Missing Officer Protection, 45 
WASHBURN L.J. 307, 307 (2006). 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  See supra notes 29–34 and accompanying text. 
 57.  See, e.g., McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1274–76 (Del. Ch. 2008) (holding 
non-director CEO liable for negligence while affirming efficacy of director-exculpating 
clause). 
 58.  Act of July 7, 1977, ch. 119, 61 Del. Laws 328, 328 (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 10, §	3114(a) (2015)); Lamb & Christensen, supra note 32, at 60. 
 59.  Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216–17 (1977). 
 60.  61 Del. Laws at 328. 
 61.  Lamb & Christensen, supra note 32, at 60. 
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amendment provided that persons who accept service as an officer of 
a Delaware corporation after January 1, 2004, are subject to 
Delaware jurisdiction in the same way as directors.62 
The historical reasons for categorically excluding officers from 
exculpation, while never logically compelling, apply now with less 
force than ever. First, some modern corporate governance structures 
routinely require officers to perform directorial functions while 
remaining non-director officers.63 Hence, while failing to distinguish 
between officers and directors for the purposes of exculpation 
eligibility may not have been terribly problematic at the time of Van 
Gorkom, the contemporary corporate governance structure 
represented in Rippy undoubtedly highlights the problems inherent in 
such a failure to so distinguish today. Further, the statutory restraints 
that limited the ability of plaintiffs to hale officer defendants into 
court no longer exist.64 While plaintiffs’ historical statutory inability to 
hale officers into court may have justified officers’ original exclusion 
from exculpation, the removal of plaintiff limitations means that 
exculpation for officers is no longer a redundancy. Given these 
developments and the growing number of states that have amended 
their laws to allow officer exculpation,65 the lack of permissive officer 
exculpation generally66—and in North Carolina specifically67—is best 
explained as a readily amendable accident of history. 
II.  WHY PERMISSIVE OFFICER EXCULPATION MAKES SENSE 
Given the defects of 102(b)(7) and its progeny, this Recent 
Development argues that the NCBCA should be amended to allow 
permissive officer exculpation for at least three reasons. First, the lack 
of officer exculpation leaves a legally significant gap in liability 
coverage for officers. Second, while the gap between officers and 
directors is significant, the marginal effect on officer behavior that 
 
 62.  Act of June 30, 2003, ch. 83, sec. 3, §	18-213(f), 74 Del. Laws 213, 213 (2003). 
 63.  See infra Section II.C. 
 64.  See infra Section II.C. 
 65.  Several states have adopted permissive exculpation for officers: Maryland, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Utah, and Virginia. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. 
& ASS’NS §§	2-104(b)(8), 2-405.2 (LexisNexis 2015), MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
§	5-418 (West 2015); NEV. REV. STAT. §	78.138(7) (West 2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§	293-A:2.02(b)(4) (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. §	14A:2-7(3) (West 2016); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§	16-10a-840(4) (West 2015); VA. CODE ANN. §	13.1-692.1 (2011), respectively. 
 66.  See generally MARK A. SARGENT & DENNIS R. HONABACH, D&O LIABILITY 
HANDBOOK (West ed., Oct. 2015) (discussing various state provisions). 
 67.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	55-2-02(b)(3) (2015) (exculpation allowed only for 
directors); §	55-8-51 (indemnification available to directors and officers). 
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potential liability for negligence via non-exculpation may have is 
likely outweighed by the costs of enforcing the current statutory 
scheme. Third, the current lack of officer exculpation allows for 
inequitable and confusing outcomes as between directors and officers. 
A. North Carolina’s Business Corporations Act Leaves a 
Problematic “Gap” in Liability Coverage for Officers 
North Carolina’s Business Corporations Act insulates directors 
from liability to a greater extent than it insulates officers. Directors 
may be exculpated68 and indemnified,69 while officers may only70 be 
indemnified.71 While both exculpation and indemnification are 
management-insulating devices, the differences between exculpation 
and indemnification are more than semantic. Exculpation is superior 
to indemnification as a protective shield because (1)	exculpation is 
effective regardless of the defendant company’s solvency,72 
(2)	indemnification covers only “reasonable expenses” incurred in the 
case of a settlement,73 and (3)	exculpated defendants accused of 
ordinary negligence may be able to move for dismissal at the motion-
to-dismiss stage of litigation.74 
First, exculpation is superior to indemnification because, unlike 
indemnification agreements, the efficacy of exculpatory clauses is not 
dependent on company solvency.75 As others have noted, the 
 
 68.  N.C. GEN. STAT. §	55-2-02 (2015) (“The articles of incorporation may set forth 
any provision that under this Chapter is required or permitted to be set forth in the 
bylaws, and may also set forth:	.	.	.	A provision limiting or eliminating the personal liability 
of any director arising out of an action whether by or in the right of the corporation or 
otherwise for monetary damages for breach of any duty as a director. No such provision 
shall be effective with respect to (i)	acts or omissions that the director at the time of such 
breach knew or believed were clearly in conflict with the best interests of the 
corporation.”) (emphasis added). 
 69.  §	55-8-51. 
 70.  Insurance, while available to officers, does not cover suits brought against officers 
by the corporation. See infra note 155. 
 71.  §	55-8-42(e). 
 72.  See infra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. 
 73.  See infra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
 74.  See infra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
 75.  J. Phil Carlton & M. Guy Brooks, Corporate Director and Officer 
Indemnification: Alternative Methods for Funding, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 53, 58 
(1989); see also Ronald E. Mallen & David W. Evans, Surviving the Directors’ and 
Officers’ Liability Crisis: Insurance and the Alternatives, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 439, 466 
(1987) (“The failing of any indemnification agreement is that even if such an agreement is 
valid, its significance depends upon the financial stability of the corporation. For the 
established, financially solid corporation indemnification agreements afford meaningful 
and reliable protection for directors and officers. For the newly formed or thinly 
capitalized company, the protection of the indemnity agreement may be illusory. Many 
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deficiency of indemnification is that the “offer [to indemnify] is only 
as good as the ability and willingness of the corporation to pay.”76 
When corporations become insolvent, as Cooperative did,77 corporate 
officers seeking to enforce indemnity claims necessarily compete with 
other creditors.78 No such problem exists for exculpated defendants. 
Second, exculpation is superior to indemnification because in 
North Carolina, indemnified (but not exculpated) defendants must 
pay the “unreasonable” costs incurred in any litigation proceedings 
that do not end in a final adjudication.79 Unlike only indemnified 
defendants, exculpated persons may avoid litigation of the messy 
“reasonableness” question and receive protection from all costs 
related to the litigation and settlement of the matter.80 
Third, exculpatory clauses may provide defendants with tactical 
litigation advantages which indemnification does not. If exculpated, 
directors accused of duty of care breaches may successfully move for 
dismissal without expending the resources necessary for a trial.81 
While the paucity of non-Delaware case law regarding director 
exculpation makes North Carolina’s future adjudication of 102(b)(7) 
claims less than certain,82 Delaware’s allowance of exculpated 
director-defendants to move for dismissal at the outset of cases 
suggests that North Carolina courts may follow suit.83 Absent 
exculpation, officers are denied the tactical litigation advantages 
 
lawsuits against directors and officers are brought because the financial failure of the 
corporation leaves them as the only potentially deep pockets.”). 
 76.  Carlton & Brooks, supra note 75, at 58. 
 77.  See supra note 21. 
 78.  Carlton & Brooks, supra note 75, at 58. 
 79.  N.C. GEN. STAT. §	55-8-51(e) (2015) (“Indemnification permitted under this 
section in connection with a proceeding by or in the right of the corporation that is 
concluded without a final adjudication on the issue of liability is limited to reasonable 
expenses incurred in connection with the proceeding.”) (emphasis added). 
 80.  See id. 
 81.  See Richard B. Kapnick & Courtney A. Rosen, Using Exculpatory Clauses in 
Defending Against Breach-of-Fiduciary-Duty Claims, 24:22 CORP. OFFICERS & 
DIRECTORS LIABILITY: ANDREWS LITIG. REPORTER 1, 3 (Apr. 27, 2009). 
 82.  For example, state courts in Illinois and Texas, while dismissing suits against 
exculpated director-defendants, have not expressly relied on exculpatory clauses to do so. 
See Shaper v. Bryan, 864 N.E.2d 876, 879 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (basing dismissal on the 
plaintiffs’ failure to allege facts sufficient to rebut presumption of business judgment rule); 
Elloway v. Pate, 238 S.W.3d 882, 896 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the plaintiff failed 
to produce evidence of defendants’ gross negligence). 
 83.  A New York court, applying Delaware law, emphasized that the “great deference 
given to the existence and legal effect of the exculpatory provision” seen in Delaware 
cases like Malpiede v. Townson greatly influenced the analysis dismissing the complaint. 
Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Hiner, No. 602748/03, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 9362, at *14 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Aug. 29, 2006). 
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exculpatory clauses may provide and must further litigate duty of care 
claims.84 
B. Excluding Officers from Exculpation Is More Costly Than It Is 
Worth 
Because the costs of statutorily precluding officers from 
permissive exculpation likely outweigh the benefits that potential 
liability for negligence has on officer behavior, permissive officer 
exculpation should be allowed. Further, because the enforcement of 
an officer’s duty of care85 ultimately comes via litigation,86 a system 
using litigation as a check on behavior is justified only if it 
accomplishes deterrence, compensation, or punishment.87 While it is 
probable that exposure to potential liability deters some officers from 
negligent behavior, the important question, as Professor Honabach88 
notes, is whether the “marginal benefit of improved decision-making 
[is] greater than the sum of the cost of increased caution in decision-
making and the cost of actual litigation necessary to make the threat 
of litigation credible.”89 This Recent Development asserts that those 
two costs—decision-making caution and actual litigation—make the 
preclusion of officers from permissive exculpation more expensive 
than it is worth. 
Because many powerful deterrents of negligent officer behavior 
already exist,90 measuring the exact impact that potential liability (via 
non-exculpation) for negligent acts has on officer behavior is difficult. 
Despite the continued prevalence of corporate officer negligence in 
the presence of non-litigation based deterrents, few doubt that such 
deterrents nevertheless exist and influence officer behavior.91 When 
 
 84.  See generally Kapnick & Rosen, supra note 81 (describing how exculpatory 
clauses can be used to defend against breach of duty claims). 
 85.  The relevant officer behavior regards breaches of care, not loyalty. Exculpating 
officers for breaches of loyalty would violate public policy and create obviously perverse 
incentives for officers to self-deal or otherwise be disloyal. This Recent Development does 
not advocate for exculpation—permissive or otherwise—in such cases. 
 86.  Honabach, supra note 54, at 332. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Professor Honabach is a leading scholar on director and author liability and a 
joint author of West’s D&O Liability Handbook. See supra note 66. 
 89.  Honabach, supra note 54, at 334. 
 90.  Id. at 332. Such deterrents include: loss of reputation, loss of employment, desire 
to conform to cultural norms, and a desire to comport with ethical standards. In publicly 
traded companies, significant disclosures mandated by the SEC likely further deter 
negligent officer behavior. See generally Matthew R. King et. al., Securities Fraud, 46 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1027, 1028–29 (2009) (discussing SEC disclosure requirements). 
 91.  Honabach, supra note 54, at 332–33. 
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considering the existing and cost-free deterrents already in place,92 
the additional value of holding officers liable for ordinary negligence 
seems marginal at best.93 
Even if holding officers liable by withholding exculpation adds 
significant deterrence-based value, its benefits are still likely 
outweighed by its costs because some risk-taking will be shifted to 
directors.94 Statutory schemes where directors but not officers can be 
exculpated “simply encourage officers to place more decisions in the 
hands of the board, and to take fewer, and less risky, initiatives on 
their own, so as to avoid liability.”95 This makes delegation from the 
board to officers challenging and makes board service more time-
intensive and costly to corporations.96 It also may encourage officers, 
when they do make discretional decisions, to be overly cautious in 
their decision making to the detriment of the corporation.97 
Rippy highlights the costly shift in risk-taking, from officers to 
directors, sometimes engendered by schemes exculpating only 
directors.98 In Rippy, the two non-director officers were the vice 
president of mortgage lending and the chief operating officer99—
positions requiring technical expertise and financial acumen. 
Conversely, six director-defendants, according to the complaint,100 
had no such expertise yet still participated in the loan approval 
process.101 Would the decision-making process and structure have 
 
 92.  See supra note 90. 
 93.  This Recent Development is not examining the effect of non-exculpation on 
officer behavior in a vacuum. Hence, the relevant inquiry concerns the marginal effect that 
non-exculpation has on officer behavior within the context of the current statutory scheme. 
Crucially, the current officer protections (i.e. D&O insurance, indemnity, and the business 
judgment rule) reduce the value of non-exculpation as a deterrent because each of those 
protections overlap to some extent with the protections exculpation provides. In other 
words, adding permissive exculpation to the protections already available to officers will 
likely have little effect on their behavior. Paradoxically, the more officers are already 
protected, the more it makes sense (from a cost-benefit paradigm) to allow permissive 
exculpation. While the benefits of withholding exculpation (in the current statutory 
scheme) are small, the high costs of withholding exculpation (and seeking to impose 
liability) stay the same. 
 94.  Hamermesh & Sparks, supra note 32, at 875. (“[A] default rule that would place 
officers at substantially greater risk of care-based liability than the risk faced by directors 
would impinge upon the board’s managerial prerogative[.]”). 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Honabach, supra note 54, at 333. Of course, a lack of exculpation will not always 
encourage cautious behavior. 
 98.  FDIC ex rel. Coop. Bank v. Rippy, 799 F.3d 301, 313 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 99.  Complaint, supra note 23, at 3. 
 100.  Id. at 2–3. 
 101.  Rippy, 799 F.3d at 313. 
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looked differently if the non-director officers were exculpated? While 
the answer to this question is difficult to ascertain, it seems likely that 
a reason102 for the non-director officers’ unwillingness to lead the 
loan-approval process may have been their lack of liability protection 
relative to the directors.103 
Another cost of withholding officer exculpation is the literal cost 
of enforcement. Because corporate litigation is so expensive,104 there 
is good reason to believe that, at least in some cases, shareholders 
would want to prevent liability litigation directed at corporate 
officers.105 Notably, even when officers are found liable for ordinary 
negligence and are compelled to render monetary damages, merely 
shifting money from negligent officers to angry shareholders does not 
add value to the company.106 Because officers must at times be sued to 
make the lack of officer exculpation even a marginally effective 
deterrent and because such litigation is painfully expensive, the 
“benefit” of precluding officers from exculpation likely is outweighed 
by its pecuniary cost.107 
Rippy illustrates the marginal value of holding officers liable for 
ordinary negligence in duty of care cases. In Rippy, the non-director 
officers108 committed potentially negligent acts even though they were 
not exculpated.109 The exculpated directors committed the same 
acts.110 The fact that the non-exculpated officers acted in the same 
manner as their exculpated director colleagues suggests that potential 
officer liability via non-exculpation111 played a relatively small role in 
shaping officer behavior regarding individual loan decisions.112 The 
 
 102.  It is also likely that the relatively small size of the company played a role in 
blurring the roles of Cooperative’s management. 
 103.  See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 104.  No one knows exactly how much is spent each year on corporate litigation. 
However, a 2010 survey of Fortune 200 companies revealed that respondents spent an 
average of nearly $115 million per year on litigation in 2008—up 73% from $66 million per 
year in 2000. U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, LITIGATION COST 
SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES 2 (2010) (reporting at the 2010 Conference on Civil 
Litigation at Duke Law School). 
 105.  Honabach, supra note 54, at 332. 
 106.  Indeed, Honabach correctly points out that litigation costs incurred to bring 
about the shift in monies are a deadweight loss. Id. at 334. 
 107.  See supra notes 104–106 and accompanying text. 
 108.  See supra note 24. 
 109.  FDIC ex rel. Coop. Bank v. Rippy, 799 F.3d 301, 313 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 110.  See id. at 313. 
 111.  See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 112.  It is important to distinguish between the lack of officer exculpation’s effect on 
the structure of the decision-making process and the lack of officer exculpation’s effect on 
individual decisions. As has been noted, non-officer exculpating schemes often engender 
atypical corporate decision-making structures by encouraging officers to share the risks of 
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tenuous connection between the deterrent effect of potential liability 
pursuant to non-exculpation and actual officer behavior makes the 
exclusion of officers from permissive exculpation hard to justify from 
a cost-benefit standpoint. While the benefits of officer non-
exculpation are probably marginal and often unclear, the cost of 
attempting to impose liability on officers in non-exculpation schemes 
has not been ambiguous.113 
C. The Current Lack of Officer Exculpation Allows for Inequitable 
and Confusing Outcomes as between Directors and Officers 
Because officers and directors have the same duties of care and 
fiduciary duties, allowing permissive officer exculpation will engender 
fairer outcomes and less confusing jurisprudence. Directors have a 
duty to act in good faith and with ordinary care.114 As the Rippy court 
noted,115 officers116 are held to an identical standard.117 Directors and 
officers also have the same fiduciary duties.118 Further, in some cases, 
 
decision-making with directors. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. However, once 
the decision-making structure is in place and decision-making duties are shared, the lack 
of exculpation for officers but not directors likely plays a negligible role in determining the 
outcome of individual decisions. The reasons for this are not entirely clear, but it is 
possible that officers believe that sharing their decision-making burden with directors 
affords them the same protections as directors, at least in regards to jointly-made 
decisions. In states without permissive officer exculpation, of course—and as 
Cooperative’s officers painfully learned—this is simply not the case. 
 113.  While the exact amount of the legal fees is unknown, the Rippy litigation has 
spanned four years and involved dozens of attorneys from at least five law firms. See 
Rippy, 799 F.3d at 306, 309. 
 114.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	55-8-30(a) (2015) (“A director shall discharge his duties as 
a director, including his duties as a member of a committee: (1)	In good faith; (2)	With the 
care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar 
circumstances; and (3)	In a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the 
corporation.”). 
 115.  Rippy, 799 F.3d at 311. 
 116.  The statute applies to officers “with discretionary authority.” N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§	55-8-42(a) (2015). While there is some debate as to which officers should be deemed to 
have discretionary authority under the statute, there is no doubt that the officers in Rippy 
had such authority. Complaint, supra note 23, at 14–15 (discussing officer approval of 
loans). 
 117.  N.C. GEN. STAT. §	55-8-42 (2015) (providing the identical standard of care for 
officers as is given for directors in §	55-8-30). Of course, the application of the duty of care 
standard for officers and directors can vary greatly depending on, among other things, the 
level of knowledge officers have relative to directors. See infra Section III.A. 
 118.  See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009) (holding that officers 
have identical fiduciary duties as directors); see also State v. Custard, No. 06 CVS 4622, 
2010 WL 1035809, at *28 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2010). 
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officers and directors are responsible for the same tasks.119 Because 
the duty of care and fiduciary duties imposed on directors and officers 
are the same,120 it follows that permissible statutory protections for 
each group should likewise be congruous. 
The Rippy facts are especially illustrative of the inequities 
inherent in holding officers and directors to the same standards but 
affording them different levels of protection. In Rippy, there were 
nine defendants—one director/officer, six directors, and two 
officers.121 Both the district and appellate courts generally examined 
the defendants’ actions in the aggregate without distinguishing 
between officer and director behavior.122 
In FDIC v. Willetts,123 the Eastern District of North Carolina 
repeatedly referred to and analyzed the defendants as a group; 
specifically, the court referred to “the decisions of defendants” when 
discussing the business judgment rule.124 The court further considered 
“whether defendants employed” a rational process in making loans125 
and later examined whether the challenged “actions of the 
defendants” could be attributed to a rational business purpose.126 In 
eventually ruling in favor of the defendants, the Willetts court did not 
discuss any differences between director and officer behavior.127 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit similarly failed to 
distinguish between directors and officers when examining conduct.128 
The Rippy court observed that “Bank management promised to 
address the issues” highlighted in the CAMELS reports.129 The Rippy 
court also noted that the joint report alleged that “Cooperative’s 
 
 119.  Ironically, while the jurisprudential impact of Van Gorkom concerned directors, 
much of the actual criticized behavior was arguably behavior normally attributed to 
officers. Lamb & Christensen, supra note 32, at 56 n.51. 
 120.  See supra notes 114–118. 
 121.  See supra notes 23–24. 
 122.  See infra notes 123–130 and accompanying text. 
 123.  48 F. Supp. 3d 844 (E.D.N.C. 2014). 
 124.  Willetts, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 850 (emphasis added). 
 125.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 126.  Id. at 851 (emphasis added). 
 127.  Id. A reason for the Willetts court’s lack of differentiation between director and 
officer behavior likely stemmed from their interpretation of the business judgment rule—
an interpretation the Rippy court explicitly rejected. Id. 
 128.  As previously noted, the Rippy court distinguished between officers and directors 
for the purposes of exculpation eligibility. FDIC ex rel. Coop. Bank v. Rippy, 799 F.3d 301, 
313 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[Cooperative]’s exculpatory provision does not cover Bank 
officers.”). See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 129.  Rippy, 799 F.3d at 308 (emphasis added). See supra note 15 (explaining 
CAMELS). 
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management” had ignored previously raised concerns.130 The Rippy 
court’s analysis deserves a nuanced examination. 
First, the Rippy court found that directors and officers could be 
sued for ordinary negligence.131 Next, they applied the exculpatory 
provision, which pertained only to the directors.132 Because the 
exculpatory provision did not apply to officers, the Rippy court then 
examined officer behavior in the context of the business judgment 
rule.133 The court did not readily distinguish between officer and 
director behavior in their discussion of the business judgment rule—
the director behavior was simply considered irrelevant pursuant to 
the exculpatory provision.134 However, the expert FDIC witness, used 
by the plaintiff to rebut the initial presumption that the defendants 
acted with due care, testified that “the review process was 
inconsistent with practices at other banking institutions, and did not 
comport with his understanding of officer and director duties.”135 
Hence, the behavior that removed the officer-defendants from the 
protection of the business judgment rule would likely have had the 
same inculpatory effect on the directors in the absence of an 
exculpatory clause. Cooperative’s directors were not protected 
because they acted differently or knew less than the officers; they 
were protected via statute. 
A closer examination of the defendants’ behavior in Rippy 
further highlights the confusion that can arise when directors, but not 
officers, are exculpated. In Rippy, defendant Frederick Willetts was 
both president and chairman of the Board.136 That is, he was both an 
officer and a director.137 Such role duality can be problematic when 
assessing the applicability of exculpatory clauses. As one 
commentator has noted, “[an exculpatory] statute that applies only to 
directors creates the possibility that directors who are also officers 
may face personal liability for their actions as officers, but not as 
 
 130.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 131.  Id. at 311. 
 132.  See supra note 30. 
 133.  Rippy, 799 F.3d at 313. 
 134.  This Recent Development does not argue that the Rippy court’s interpretation of 
§	55-2-02 of the North Carolina General Statutes was per se faulty and should have been 
otherwise conducted; the Rippy court did not meaningfully distinguish between officer and 
director behavior because the current statutory scheme does not require such an analysis. 
Allowing permissive exculpation for directors and officers would require courts to look 
separately at both groups’ behavior to determine whether either or both groups could 
legitimately receive exculpation. 
 135.  Rippy, 799 F.3d at 313 (emphasis added). 
 136.  Complaint, supra note 23, at 2. 
 137.  Id. 
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directors. This would mean that only outside directors, as a practical 
matter, would benefit from the statutory limitation on liability.”138 By 
allowing exculpation for directors but not officers, state legislatures—
in cases dealing with director and officer liability—leave questions139 
regarding exculpation eligibility unanswered. Such messy, and 
potentially litigious,140 questions could be avoided in a statutory 
scheme allowing officer exculpation. 
III.  COUNTERARGUMENTS 
A. “Officers and Directors Are Not the Same and Should Be Treated 
Differently” 
In the Monopoly game analogy, the distinction made between 
players was arbitrary.141 Some commentators have suggested that, for 
the purposes of imposing liability, directors and officers are different 
in salient ways and should therefore receive different levels of 
protection.142 They essentially contend that officers’ proximity to 
decision-making (relative to directors) justifies placing on them a 
different (non-arbitrary) standard for exculpation eligibility.143 
Further, the argument goes, viewing officer-director liability in the 
principal-agent paradigm (with officers as agents) provides a 
meaningful differentiation between the two groups and a coherent 
structure with which to evaluate conduct.144 
 
 138.  Mark A. Sargent, Symposium: Two Cheers for the Maryland Director and Officer 
Liability Statute, 18 UNIV. BALT. L. REV. 278, 304 (1989). 
 139.  Several questions remain unanswered: Was Willetts acting as a director or an 
officer when he approved eight out of the nine commercial real estate loans in question? 
Should he be exculpated for some acts but not others? How should courts decide? Is 
directorship dispositive and therefore wholly exculpatory? See Complaint, supra note 23, 
at 2. 
 140.  See In re Capital One Derivative S’holder Litig., 979 F. Supp. 2d 682, 691 (E.D. 
Va. 2013) (“[Defendant-officer/CEO] cannot be liable for breaches of the duty of care 
when he acts as a director. It follows that to state a claim against [defendant officer–CEO] 
for breach of the duty of care where, as here, there are no allegations of bad faith, 
intentional misconduct, or knowing violation of the law, plaintiffs must plead facts 
plausibly alleging that he acted solely in his capacity as an officer, thereby removing his 
actions from protection under the exculpatory clause.”). 
 141.  See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 142.  See Lyman P. Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are 
Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1603 (2005). 
 143.  Id. (“Recalling the agency law status of corporate officers	.	.	.	clarifies immensely 
why courts can and should scrutinize officer conduct more closely than they now review 
director performance—i.e., the fiduciary duties of agents are more demanding than those 
of directors, and officers rightly face a greater risk of personal liability for misconduct.”). 
 144.  See id. at 1602. 
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It is true that, in some cases, officer and director functions are 
sufficiently different to justify imposing disparate standards for 
liability.145 This is especially true in corporations with boards 
containing a significant proportion of outside directors.146 In such 
cases,147 information asymmetry or effective CEO control148 over the 
board may justify allowing permissive exculpation for directors but 
not officers.149 However, that officer and director roles are sufficiently 
different in some corporations150 to impose different standards for 
liability does not imply that such differences universally exist. As 
Cooperative’s management structure illustrates,151 some corporations 
intermingle classic director duties with quintessential officer 
responsibilities and vice versa. When this occurs, corporations should 
have the opportunity to impose the same liability standard on officers 
as they do on directors via permissive exculpation.152 That single 
 
 145.  Such cases include companies where outside directors comprise a significant 
portion of the board. Because “[b]eing an outside director is a part-time job[,]” outside 
directors have less time to review the information they have. Troy A. Paredes, Too Much 
Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate 
Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 724–25 (2005). Outside directors also have 
limited access personnel who might help them vet important issues and must otherwise 
depend on the CEO and other high-ranking officers to supply crucial information. Id. at 
725. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  See, e.g., McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1273–76 (Del. Ch. 2008) (holding 
that directors who placed non-director CEO in charge of the acquisition process were not 
liable for negligence, while CEO with conflict of interest was liable for breach of care and 
loyalty). 
 148.  SEC Commissioner Cynthia Glassman stated that the “closed nomination process 
dominated by powerful CEOs, and the entrenchment of directors,	.	.	.	[leads] to an 
unhealthy coziness in some instances between ostensibly independent directors and the 
executives whose performance they [are] supposed to oversee.” Cynthia A. Glassman, 
Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Issues Surrounding the SEC’s Shareholder Access 
Proposal (Mar. 8, 2004). See Johnson & Millon, supra note 142, at 1613–14 (arguing that 
the “overly ‘cozy’ relationship between boards of directors and senior officers	.	.	.	may 
result in a corporate culture in which directors do not regard officers as persons owing 
high fiduciary duties to the corporation”). 
 149.  See Paredes, supra note 145, at 725. 
 150.  This Recent Development concedes that officer exculpation may not be 
appropriate in corporations where director and officer roles and responsibilities are 
sufficiently distinguishable and separate. See supra note 117. 
 151.  See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text. 
 152.  Whether courts should be able to intervene in cases where the articles of 
incorporation are insufficiently tailored to a corporation’s management structure is 
beyond the scope of this Recent Development. However, given the deference traditionally 
afforded corporations regarding business decisions, it seems likely that courts should 
generally allow even poorly tailored articles to remain in effect. See generally Susanna M. 
Kim, The Provisional Director Remedy for Corporate Deadlock: A Proposed Model 
Statute, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 138–40 (2003) (discussing judicial intervention and 
rewriting of corporations’ articles of incorporation in deadlock situations). Because 
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persons working in relatively smaller companies continue to share 
director and officer titles further underscores the importance of 
allowing corporations the kind of bylaw flexibility permissive officer 
exculpation provides. 
B. “Officers Already Have Adequate Protection from Liability” 
Another argument against officer exculpation is that the 
protections already afforded them adequately insulate them from 
liability. While indemnity, director and officer (“D&O”) insurance,153 
and the business judgment rule undoubtedly protect officers, such 
protections may be inadequate when officer and director behavior are 
indistinguishable from each other. As has been shown, 
indemnification is inferior to exculpation as a liability shield.154 D&O 
insurance can mitigate officer exposure, but is inferior to exculpation 
in many of the same ways that indemnification is.155 Finally, the 
business judgment rule provides some common law protection for 
decisions made in good faith.156 However, as Rippy illustrates, just 
because officer conduct is evaluated in light of the business judgment 
rule does not preclude liability in cases of ordinary negligence.157 
Because the current available officer protections—though not 
inconsequential—are inferior to the protections available via 
exculpation,158 shareholders should have the option of providing the 
 
judicial intervention regarding poorly tailored articles would require an evaluation of 
shareholders’ decision to exculpate officers, it seems likely that courts would be hesitant to 
do so. 
 153.  D&O insurance can in some cases cover liability where indemnification cannot. 
See Lamb & Christensen, supra note 32, at 70. 
 154.  See supra Section II.A. 
 155.  Namely, D&O insurance does not provide the tactical litigation advantages which 
exculpation does and requires insured defendants to seek, and in some cases negotiate 
with, insurers to settle the claims made against them. D&O insurance is also not available 
in cases where the corporation brings suit against management. Hamermesh & Sparks, 
supra note 32, at 871 & n.42 (“[D]irector and officer liability insurance policies uniformly 
include an ‘insured v. insured’ exclusion, denying coverage where the corporation itself 
initiates the claim against the officer.”). 
 156.  See supra note 32. 
 157.  FDIC ex rel. Coop. Bank v. Rippy, 799 F.3d 301, 313–14 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 158.  While there are significant differences in protection between exculpation and 
existing officer liability shields, it may not be reasonable to assume that officers’ 
familiarity (or lack thereof) with these differences will effectuate a meaningful difference 
in their behavior. Hence, while exculpation is clearly legally superior to existing officer 
protections, it is likely that allowing officer exculpation would not significantly further 
deter negligent officer behavior. See supra note 93. Hence, that the high degree of overlap 
between exculpation and other available protections makes non-exculpation a marginally 
less valuable deterrent of negligent behavior does not necessarily beg the conclusion that 
the differences between exculpation and other protections are legally insignificant. Id. 
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highest protection to officers when the management structure of their 
corporation renders director and officer functions indistinguishable. 
CONCLUSION 
When officers and directors have the same information, 
functions, standard of care, and fiduciary duties, they should be 
afforded the same protections. Nominal nonconformity alone does 
not justify imposing disparate standards for liability. Unfortunately, 
the NCBCA, as it is currently codified and understood, allows for 
disparate exculpation eligibility treatment based on just such titular 
technicalities.159 
While the actual differences between officers and directors in 
some cases are largely technical, the differences between the 
protections afforded them are material and significant.160 Rippy 
represents these problematic differences in liability protection.161 
Further, while the gap between officers and directors is significant, 
the marginal effect on officer behavior that potential liability for 
negligence via non-exculpation may have is likely outweighed by the 
costs of enforcing the current statutory scheme.162 In addition to being 
costly, the current lack of officer exculpation allows for inequitable 
and confusing outcomes as between directors and officers.163 
While this Recent Development argues for the expansion of 
officer protections, it does so only in a narrow set of circumstances. 
Exculpation—for officers and directors—should only be available for 
non-grossly negligent breaches of care.164 Self-dealing, fraudulent, 
embezzling, or reckless officers would receive no respite under the 
proposed change.165 Further, the proposed amendment calls for 
allowance of permissive officer exculpation. Shareholders—those 
most sensitive to any potential negative effects of exculpation—would 
be the arbiters of this important corporate governance question. 
While it is difficult to predict in what circumstances shareholders 
would opt for officer exculpation, this Recent Development suggests 
 
 159.  Rippy, 799 F.3d at 313. 
 160.  See supra Section II.A. 
 161.  See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 162.  See supra Section II.B. 
 163.  See supra Section II.C. 
 164.  See supra note 85. 
 165.  See supra note 85. 
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that such exculpation is appropriate when officer and director duties 
and functions are significantly intermingled.166 
The economic, theoretical, and policy justifications for allowing 
director exculpation apply, at least in some cases, to officers. For 
those reasons, North Carolina should follow the example of states167 
that have recognized this by amending the NCBCA to allow 
permissive officer exculpation. 
JORDAN C. HILTON** 
 
 166.  See FDIC ex rel. Coop. Bank v. Rippy, 799 F.3d 301, 313 (4th Cir. 2015); 
Complaint, supra note 23, at 2–3. 
 167.  See supra note 65. 
 **  I am thankful to Thomas Hazen for his valuable insight. 
